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The vast majority of convictions in the federal criminal system oc-
curs when a defendant pleads guilty.' Pleas of guilty are entered at a
hearing governed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. In 1975, Congress substantially amended Rule 11 to expand
that hearing and thus provide a more comprehensive record of all
matters bearing on the validity of the plea.2 Such a record, it was
1. In 1974, approximately 84% of the 36,230 federal convictions were obtained by
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. [1974] AD. OF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. RE-P. 470.
2. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-64, 89
Stat. 370 (1975). Rule 11 reads in part:
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the
court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and
determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory mini-
mum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided
by law; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has
already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial
has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself;
and
(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in
open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as
to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results
from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the defendant
or his attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(I) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the de-
fendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a
view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the
attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request,
for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or
request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, the.court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in
open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is
offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer
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hoped, would assist federal courts in reviewing the great number of
post conviction attacks made on guilty pleas.3
This Note will assess the utility of the Rule 11 record in disposing
of post conviction challenges. Broadly speaking, such challenges can
be based either upon the defendant's alleged misunderstanding at the
time of pleading guilty or upon events occurring outside the guilty
plea hearing that may affect the validity of the plea.4 In the former
case, the Rule 11 record may be dispositive of the post conviction
attack. In the latter case, the record can be far less helpful, for the
defendant may easily impeach the findings made at the Rule 11 hear-
ing as to the voluntariness of his plea or the nonexistence of secret
plea bargaining. The defendant's failure to raise claims about these
matters at the hearing, furthermore, cannot properly be interpreted as
a waiver of such claims. For these reasons, the Note concludes that the
Rule 11 record will not foreclose post conviction challenges containing
credible allegations of government coercion or secret promises.
Perhaps cognizant of the limited utility of the Rule 11 record, some
federal courts concerned with finality for criminal convictions have
established evidentiary and other barriers to attacks on guilty pleas.
Also, recently adopted rules of procedure for post conviction motions5
attempt to offer a means for disposing of such motions without a full
judicial hearing, in part by expanding the written record on which
they may be considered. The Note argues that these techniques will
fail to eliminate profitless hearings on the validity of guilty pleas or
its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity
to consider the presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement,
the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and
sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the
court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant
personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court
is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to
then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty
plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to
the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
3. See p. 1405 infra.
4. Another important category of claims alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. E.g.,
Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972) (claim of conflict of interest by counsel); see Green,
Ward & Arcuri, Plea Bargaining: Fairness and Inadequacy of Representation, 7 COLUm.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 495 (1975) (collecting cases). Since Rule 11 makes no attempt to
insulate guilty pleas against attacks of this sort, consideration of the problems they
create is outside the scope of this Note.
5. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
(effective Feb. 1, 1977), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2255, at 104-22 (West Supp. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as SECrioN 2255 RULES].
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will mechanically deny hearings regardless of the underlying merits
of the challenge. The Note concludes that post conviction attacks on
guilty pleas need to be heard despite the admitted costs, both in time
and in expense, that such hearings entail.
I. Rule 11 and Pleas of Guilty
The Constitution requires that guilty pleas be intelligent and
voluntary.6 To be intelligent, a plea must be made by a mentally
competent defendant 7 who understands both the charges against him"
and the consequences of his plea.9 To be voluntary, a plea must be
free of threats or other coercion that would impermissibly distort the
6. As amended in 1966, Rule 11 required a judge accepting a guilty plea to determine
that the plea was made "voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and
the consequences of the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1087, 1097 (1966). These
requirements derive from the fact that a guilty plea embodies a waiver of trial rights.
See note 45 infra. These rights include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to trial by jury and the right to confront adverse witnesses. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Boykin required,
as a matter of constitutional law, that "the prerequisites of a valid waiver" of these rights
be spread on the record before a guilty plea is accepted. 395 U.S. at 242.
7. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1963); Malinauskas v. United States, 505
F.2d 649, 652-54 (5th Cir. 1974); Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973). In
defining the level of competence needed to stand trial, the Supreme Court has stated
that a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding [and] a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him." Duskey v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960) (per curiam) (quoting from and adopting position of Solicitor General). This
standard is usually applied to defendants who plead guilty. See Malinauskas v. United
States, 505 F.2d 649, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515, 517
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973). But see Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-
15 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying a higher standard of competence to guilty plea defendants).
8. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 & n.13 (1976); McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969). Cf. Belgarde v. Turner, 421 F.2d 1395, 1396 (10th Cir.
1970) (failure to explain difference between second and third degree burglary voids
plea). This requirement ensures that the defendant understands the elements that the
state must prove to prevail at trial, i.e., that he possesses "an understanding of the law
in relation to the facts." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 466 (footnote omitted).
See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUiLTY § 1.4, Commentary at 26 (Approved
Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS].
9. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); United States v. Blair, 470
F.2d 331, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 908 (1973). See generally J. BOND,
PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS, 138-54 (1975).
Before 1975, Rule 11 required the court to ascertain that the defendant understood
the "consequences of the plea." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1087, 1097 (1966). The 1975
Amendments dropped this language and substituted a requirement that the defendant
be informed of "the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law." FED. R. CRM.. P. 1l(c)(1). The 1966
language stimulated considerable litigation as to what "consequences" were sufficiently
serious to warrant inclusion in the judicial warnings. The 1975 substitute no doubt will
do the same. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 635-37 (2d Cir. 1976).
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defendant's choice.10 If these constitutional requisites are not met, a
guilty plea may be set aside in a post conviction attack."
10. The most complete statement of the standard used to test the voluntariness of a
guilty plea is found in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970):
"'[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences . . . must
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by
promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes).'"
Id. at 755 (quoting with approval Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (quoting Shelton v. United States,
242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J., dissenting))). This standard proscribes two
different sorts of coercion. In some cases, government conduct (e.g., a prolonged beat-
ing) will so overbear the defendant's will as to make him incapable of independent
choice. In other cases, although the defendant's ability to choose remains unimpaired, a
plea will be found involuntary if induced by unfair or illegal government tactics (e.g.,
a threat to impose an illegal sentence). See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 799, 801-02
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In assessing coercion, courts apply different rules to different legal actors. Prosecutors
are given considerable latitude to "persuade" defendants to plead guilty. Essentially, they
may threaten defendants with any consequences within the scope of lawful prosecutorial
powers. E.g., Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181, 1188 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
853 (1970) (threat to prosecute when facts warranted prosecution not coercive); Ford v.
United States, 418 F.2d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1969) (same). But see Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d
42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2672 (1977) (prosecutor may not threaten
to add to indictment when defendant refuses to plead guilty). But if prosecutors threaten
defendants with physical abuse or illegal trial tactics, the plea is held involuntary.
See Broxson v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 397, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1973) (threat to shoot and
kill defendant; threat of sexual harm to wife and sister); Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d
897, 900 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (threat to revive charge barred
by speedy trial rights). Similar rules are applied to police and federal agents. See
Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 214-15 (1973) (physical abuse and prolonged in-
terrogation by police); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 102-04 (1942) (threat by F.B.I.
agent to manufacture false evidence).
Stricter rules govern judicial behavior. See Notes of the Advisory Committee on 1975
Amendments to Rules, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1304-05 (Supp.
V 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Advisory Committee Notes]; Ferguson, The Role of the
Judge in Plea Bargaining, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 26, 40-43 (1971) (citing English and American
cases); Gallagher, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining; A Search for New Standards,
9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 29, 38-45 (1974). For example, a judicial threat to sentence a
defendant harshly if he does not plead guilty will invalidate a plea whether or not the
sentence is within the judge's legal powers. See Matthews v. United States, 533 F.2d 900,
903 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1156 (1977); United States v. Tateo, 214 F.
Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Rule 11 now forbids judges to participate in discussions
between prosecutor and defense counsel leading up to a plea agreement. FED. R. CRIf. P.
1l(e)(1). See United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1976) (Rule 11 bars
judge from promising specific sentence prior to entry of guilty plea).
Defense attorneys may also engage in coercive conduct. For example, a plea made in
reliance on false statements by defense counsel that a plea bargain has been arranged
with the government is deemed involuntary. See United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162,
164 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Pallotta, 433 F.2d 594, 595 (Ist Cir. 1970). Defense
attorneys are also forbidden to pressure defendants into pleading guilty by threatening
to withdraw from the case. See Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566, 569 (4th Cir. 1976)
(Butzner, J., dissenting); Coleman v. Wilson, 401 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1065 (1969).
11. Defendants in federal court have two avenues to post conviction relief: the mo-
tion to withdraw a guilty plea, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d), and the motion to vacate or
correct sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). The two procedures offer broadly similar relief.
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In recent years, a series of steps has been taken to improve the
procedures for taking guilty pleas and thus to enhance the finality of
convictions based on them. In 1966, Rule 11 was amended to expand
the scope of the plea hearing in order to produce a better record.12
District judges were instructed to ascertain the intelligent (that is,
knowing) and voluntary character of the plea by addressing the de-
fendant personally, rather than by relying on the representations of
defense counsel.' 3 The Amendments also required that a "factual
basis" for the plea be established, either by admissions of the defendant
or by evidence in the hands of the government.' 4 It was hoped that the
1966 Amendments would "prevent post-conviction attacks," which
previously had "required extensive hearings."'1
The effectiveness of the 1966 Amendments initially was hampered
by the courts' failure to insist that the new requirements be strictly
observed. Many appellate courts permitted guilty pleas to stand even
though district judges had not fully complied with Rule 11.16 Yet in
Although the motion to withdraw a guilty plea affords somewhat greater discretion to
the district judge, see Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181, 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 853 (1970), a violation of defendant's constitutional rights in accepting a plea
mandates relief regardless of the type of motion made. See United States v. Crusco, 536
F.2d 21, 26 (3d Cir. 1976). See generally 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrCE ff 32.07[4] (2d ed.
1976). This Note will focus primarily on the motion to vacate sentence, usually called a
"§ 2255 motion."
12. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1087, 1097 (1966). See Notes of Advisory Committee
on 1966 Amendments to Rules, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 4489-90
(1970) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Advisory Committee Note]. For commentary on the 1966
Amendments, see Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules?, 21 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1, 8-11 (1964); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo.
L.J. 1276, 1309-10 (1966).
13. See 1966 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 12, at 4489; Hoffman, supra note
12, at 10. Before the 1966 Amendments, judges had relied on statements by defense
counsel. See, e.g., Nunley v. United States, 294 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 991 (1962); United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 566 (D.D.C. 1959)
("The Court may always rely on representations of counsel.") Cf. Comment, 18 S.C.L.
REv. 668, 673-74 (1966) (disapproving of judicial reliance on representations of defense
counsel).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); 1966 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 12, at 4489-90.
Because the "factual basis" can be satisfied by defendant's admission that he committed
the crime, problems arise only when defendant refuses to admit guilt expressly but
nevertheless wishes to plead guilty. In these circumstances, courts must examine the
sufficiency of the government's evidence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38
n.10 (1970).
15. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 11.
16. See Kennedy v. United States, 397 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
1018 (1969) (district judge's noncompliance with Rule 11 not per se a basis for setting
aside a guilty plea); Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272 (1st Cir. 1967) (same);
Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d 23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 881 (1967);
Brokaw v. United States, 368 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967).
But see Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965) (failure to comply with
Rule 11 is ground to set aside the plea). These courts did provide defendants with an
evidentiary hearing on the intelligence of their guilty plea when the requirements of
Rule 11 had not been strictly satisfied.
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1969, McCarthy v. United States'7 made full compliance with Rule 11
mandatory. Recognizing that the Rule was designed to develop a com-
plete record on the validity of a guilty plea at the time it was entered,
the Supreme Court held that defendants who pled guilty at a defective
hearing must be allowed to plead again.' s The Court emphasized that
strict compliance with Rule 11 would deter or at least facilitate the
disposition of "the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction at-
tacks" on guilty pleas.1
In 1971, Santobello v. New York"- cast doubt on the viability of
existing Rule 11 procedures when it established a new constitutional
basis for attacking guilty pleas. Santobello confronted the prevalent
but theretofore officially unacknowledged practice of plea bargain-
ing.21 The Court explicitly recognized the propriety of plea bargain-
ing, but held that government promises which were "part of the in-
ducement or consideration" for a guilty plea had to be fully performed
if the plea were to stand. 2 After Santobello it was no longer sufficient
17. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
18. Id. at 468-69. Recently, some courts have questioned whether mere noncompliance
with Rule 11 without a showing of prejudice should be grounds for relief in a § 2255
motion. Such courts limit McCarthy to review by direct appeal or by motion to withdraw
a guilty plea. See Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (D.C. Cir. 1977); McRae v. United States, 540 F.2d 943,
945-46 (8th Cir. 1976); Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73, 76-77 (7th Cir. 1975).
19. 394 U.S. at 465.
20. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
21. On the prevalence of plea bargaining, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CovRTs 9 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 50-51 (1968); Newman & NeMoyer, Issues of Propriety
in Negotiated Justice, 47 DEN. L.J. 367, 369 (1970). The frequency of plea bargaining is
known to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; it is most prevalent where the caseload
is heaviest. See Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings
Before the Subcommn. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1974) (statement of Judge Webster) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings I]; Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 307 (1975). In some courts, there is little or no plea bar-
gaining; in others, certain types of plea bargains are not used. In the Southern District
of New York, for example, "[tjhere are no plea agreements in the sense of an agreement
on a recommendation of a particular sentence. And the U.S. attorney will not participate
in such discussions, and the judges do not accept them." House Hearings I, supra, at 24
(judge Lumbard). See id. at 20 (statement of Judge Webster) (no plea bargaining in
Eastern District of Missouri except agreements to drop one or more of multiple charges).
But see Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499, 502-03(1971) (every federal judge has "tacitly approved" concessions that are "tantamount to
plea bargaining").
22. 404 U.S. at 262. As explained by the Court in Santobello, the legitimacy of plea
bargaining "presuppose[s] fairness" in the agreement process. Id. at 261. Once a guilty
plea that rests on a government promise has been made, it is "reasonably due" to the
defendant that "such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262. A concurring opinion re-
ferred to "'an outraged sense of fairness' " as the basis for this rule. Id. at 266 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (quoting D. NEWMAN, CONvIcrsox 36 (1966)).
Because the Santobello majority did not explicitly state that its holding was constitu-
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to scrutinize a plea's intelligence and voluntariness: 23 if a defendant's
constitutional rights were to be enforced, the promises made had to be
identified and recorded. Because plea bargaining had traditionally
been carried on in secret and had routinely been concealed at Rule 11
hearings, 24 some means of bringing plea bargain promises to light was
needed.25
tional, see id. at 266-67 (Douglas, J., concurring), some observers interpreted it as a non-
constitutional rule. Comment, Plea Bargaining Mishaps-The Possibility of Collaterally
Attacking the Resultant Plea of Guilty, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 175 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Plea Bargaining Mishaps]. Yet Santobello originated in a
state court. The Supreme Court has no supervisory power over state courts and there was
no other federal question in the case. Unless the Court was making a constitutional
ruling, it had no right to decide the case at all. Later courts have treated Santobello as
establishing a constitutional rule. See Lebosky v. Saxbe, 508 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.
1975); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 411 (3rd Cir. 1973).
Two remedies exist for a broken plea bargain: defendant may withdraw his plea or
have the promise enforced. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). The
majority in Santobello left the choice of remedy to the discretion of the state court.
Justice Douglas, concurring, suggested that weight be given to the defendant's preference,
and three dissenting Justices would have made the defendant's preference dispositive.
Santobello thus established no firm guidelines for determining remedies. At present,
most courts allow defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if he shows a broken promise. See
Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 AMI. CRIM.
L. REv. 771, 792-94 (1973) (withdrawal of plea is "most common" form of relief granted).
23. Some observers noted that Santobello had imported into the criminal law many
of the vexing problems that surround enforcement of commercial contracts. See Paradiso
v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 411 (3rd Cir. 1973) ("Santobello . . .generated further
litigation over what constitutes a promise, whether any promise had been made, and the
effect of advice or assurance given by the defendant's own counsel.") Cf. Blackledge v.
Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1630 n.6 (1977) (analogy to parole evidence rule). Ascertaining the
conditions under which assurances by government officials will achieve the status of
enforceable promises is a common problem. See, e.g., United States v. Hammerman, 528
F.2d 326, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's prediction "likely to inculcate belief and
reliance" is enforceable promise); United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d
730, 735 (3rd Cir. 1972) (prosecutor's recommendation to court must be granted, or plea
must be allowed to be withdrawn); United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir.
1971) (trial court's prediction of probable sentence not an enforceable promise). Another
problem is the determination of which government agents can legally bind the govern-
ment. See United States v. Huffman, 490 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 988 (1974) (probation officer); Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478, 484-85 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971) (parole board); Comment, Plea Bargaining Mishaps, supra note 22, at 176-77
(police).
24. Plea bargaining has long been recognized as an "informal, invisible" process.
TAsK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 21, at 9. The fact that bargaining had taken place was
concealed because of widespread doubts about the constitutionality of pleas based on
bargains. See Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in id. at 108, 111. When a de-
fendant was questioned at the arraignment as to the voluntariness of his plea, he was
expected to deny for the record that any promises had been made to him even though
both he and the prosecutor knew that bargaining had taken place. See Amendments to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 25-26 (1975) (Prof. Leon
Friedman) (plea bargaining concealed in federal courts "all the time") [hereinafter cited
as House Hearings I1]; House Hearings I, supra note 21, at 27 (Prof. Frank Remington)
(plea bargaining concealed because of questions about its propriety).
25. This problem was acknowledged in Santobello. "[I]f [the plea] was induced by
promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known." 404 U.S. at
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The 1975 Amendments to Rule 11 were an attempt to meet these
needs. The Rule now requires a considerably more detailed inquiry
into the intelligence and voluntariness of the plea in order to produce
the comprehensive record envisioned by McCarthy.20 The Rule also
contains procedures for putting plea agreements on the record and
seeks in this way to regulate the fairness of the plea bargaining practice
that Santobello recognized.2 7
The central event of the Rule 11 hearing is still the colloquy be-
tween district judge and defendant. The defendant must be informed
of the elements of the charge against him and the minimum and
maximum penalties fixed by law; 28 he must be explicitly warned of
the trial rights he waives by pleading guilty. 29 The judge must also
question the defendant about the existence of any circumstances, such
as government force or threats, that would endanger the voluntariness
of his plea.30
After investigating the intelligent and voluntary nature of the de-
fendant's decision to plead guilty, the court must require the govern-
ment and the defendant to reveal any plea agreements they have
made.31 The defendant is asked whether he has received any promises
261-62. In the period following Santobello, but prior to the enactment of the 1975
Amendments to Rule 11, several courts of appeals instructed district courts to include
procedures designed to put plea bargains on the record in the Rule 11 inquiry. See
Moody v. United States, 497 F.2d 359, 365 (7th Cir. 1974); Bryan v. United States, 492
F.2d 775, 780-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (en banc); Paradiso v. United
States, 482 F.2d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 1973); Walter v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1972).
26. Fan. R. CaM. P. 11(c), (d).
27. Fan. R. CRiM. P. 11(e), (g). These procedures were expected to remove certain
abuses that had accompanied unregulated plea bargaining. See 1975 Advisory Committee
Notes, supra note 10, at 1304. First, by recognizing the propriety of plea bargaining and
requiring disclosure of agreements, the reforms sought to end the lack of public account-
ability that inhered in secret bargaining. See Hoffman, supra note 21, at 501. Cf. New-
man, The Agnew Plea Bargain, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 85 (1970) (condemning use of plea
bargaining by public figures in order to conceal details of their crimes and commending
prosecutors in Agnew plea bargain for providing disclosure). Second, by allowing im-
mediate judicial review of the final agreement and the circumstances under which it was
reached, the reforms sought to achieve greater fairness and consistency in outcomes. See
ABA GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 8, at § 1.8, Commentary; TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 21, at 10-13. See note 34 infra. Finally, by requiring that if a guilty plea is
accepted the judgment must reflect the terms of the bargain, amended Rule 1l(e)(3)
eliminated the risk to defendants that the court might ignore bargained-for sentencing
recommendations made by the prosecutor.
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
29. Fan. R. CRUM. P. 11(c)(3), (4).
30. FED. R. CR155. P. 11(d).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2). Significantly, the duty to reveal plea bargains does not
rest on the defendant alone. Cf. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARPAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.4
(2) (1975) (court must address "prosecutor and defense counsel and defendant personally"
to discover whether plea bargaining has occurred). As one court has observed, "[a]ny
attorney, knowing that a promise has been made ... who allows, in silence, a defendant
in effect to deny the fact to the court, must face disciplinary action." United States v.
Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 365 (Ist Cir. 1971). See Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181,
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other than those contained in the plea agreement. 32 If the parties have
engaged in plea bargaining, Rule 11 gives the district judge discretion
to accept or reject the proposed agreement. 33 By exercising this discre-
tion, district judges may eliminate plea agreements that do not meet
judicially evolved standards of fairness and propriety.3 4 Although in-
1198 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (Lay, J., dissenting); Erickson, The
Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 NOTRE DAME L.w. 835, 841-43 (1973).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
33. FED. R. CRIN. P. 11(e)(2). The Supreme Court has not defined the scope of this
discretion. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971); North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970). Two appellate courts have limited the use of this
discretion. In cases not involving plea bargaining, the-District of Columbia Circuit holds
that guilty pleas "should not be refused without good reason." McCoy v. United States,
363 F.2d 306, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378, 1379-80
(D.C. Cir. 1968). The Fifth Circuit follows the same rule. See United States v. Martinez,
486 F.2d 15, 20-21 (5th Cir. 1973). In plea bargaining cases, these courts distinguish be-
tween plea agreements that contain sentence recommendations (a judicial prerogative)
and those that contain charge reductions (a prosecutorial prerogative). Although the
district judge may refuse to entertain sentencing recommendations even though part of
a negotiated plea, see United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1032 (1975), he may not reject bargains based on dismissal of charges unless the
agreement represents "an abuse of prosecutorial discretion." United States v. Ammidown,
497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 91 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975) (district judge may not enforce "blanket proscription"
of plea bargains involving charge reduction or dismissal). See generally Note, Judicial
Discretion to Reject Negotiated Pleas, 63 GEO. L.J. 241 (1974). Other circuits limit district
court discretion less stringently. See United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st
Cir. 1971) (court should "seriously consider" proffered plea but need not meet standard
of District of Columbia Circuit); Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735, 738-39 (9th Cir.
1966) (court need not accept plea to lesser charge even if government consents).
The 1975 Amendments to Rule 11 take no position on this question. The legislative
history makes it clear that the new procedures do not require any district judge to
permit plea bargaining in his court. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADSmiN. NEws 674, 678 [hereinafter cited
without parallel citation as HousE REPORT]; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1975) (Rep.
Hungate). The Amendments do not attempt to define any criteria for when plea agree-
ments should be accepted or rejected. 1975 Advisory Conmittee Notes, supra note 10,
at 1305.
34. The extent to which courts will use Rule 11(e) to review the substance of plea
bargains is unclear. In the case of bargains reached by a defendant unrepresented by
counsel, the Advisory Committee states that judicial review "is intended to enable the
court to reject an agreement . . . unless the court is satisfied that acceptance of the
agreement adequately protects the rights of the defendant and the interest of justice."
1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10, at 1304. In the case of bargains with
counseled defendants, however, acceptance of the plea is "left to the discretion of the
individual trial judge." Id. at 1305.
It is possible that judges will be reluctant to reject proffered plea bargains for fear
that to do so would "seriously disrupt the flow of guilty pleas." Alschuler, The Trial
Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1066-67 (1976). But see
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274-78 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, C.J.) (trial courts have
an obligation "to supervise the fairness of the bargain"). Yet most commentators have
strongly urged that trial judges review the terms of bargains presented to them. See ABA
GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 8, at § 3.3(C), Commentary; ALI MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMfENT PROCEDURE § 350.5(2) (1975); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 12-
13; Enker, supra note 24, at 117-18; Note, Plea Bargaining-Proposed Amendments to
Federal Criminal Rule 11, 56 MINN. L. REv. 718, 732-34 (1972). Commentators have sug-
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dividual judges may refuse to permit any plea bargaining at all in
their courts, 35 their discretion in accepting plea agreements is not
similarly unfettered. The 1975 Amendments expressly sanction only
four commonly used types of plea bargains, 36 and the legitimacy of
other agreements remains uncertain.37 If a given agreement is accepted,
it must be reflected in the judgment and sentence imposed by the
court.3 s If an agreement is rejected, the defendant must be allowed to
withdraw his plea. 39
Rule 11 requires that a verbatim record be made of the plea-taking
proceedings.40 Courts are permitted but not required to put defendants
on oath during the hearing.4'
gested two forms of oversight. First, an attempt should be made to ensure that all de-
fendants have an equal opportunity to bargain and that differential bargaining power
does not lead to unjustified differentials in sentences. See Newman, Reshape the Deal,
9 TRIAL, May/June 1973, at 14-15; Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J.
286, 291-95 (1972). Second, agreements should be rejected if they would result in sen-
tences that fail adequately to protect the public or otherwise fail to impose appropriate
punishment for the defendant's conduct. See TASK FORCe REPORT, supra note 21, at 10,
12-13.
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(l). First, the charge may be reduced to a lesser or
related offense. Second, the government may promise to move for dismissal of other
charges. Third, the government may agree to recommend or not oppose a particular
sentence. Fourth, the government and defense attorney may agree that a ghen sentence
is an appropriate disposition of the case. 1975 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10,
at 1304. The Advisory Committee apparently meant this list to be exhaustile, referring
to the enumerated agreements as the "four possible concessions" the golernment can
offer to obtain a guilty plea. Id.
During congressional consideration of the 1975 Amendments, the House Judiciary
Committee became concerned that plea agreements requiring defendants to cooperate
with the prosecution as part of the bargain might be outlawed by this language. The
Committee therefore stated its understanding that a plea agreement could legitimately
"bind the defendant to do more than just plead guilty," e.g., to testify against a co-
defendant. House REPORT, supra note 33, at 6 u.8. Of course this proiiso, aimed at
spelling out what obligations can be placed on the defendant, does nothing to dispel the
Advisory Committee's implication that only four specified concessions can be offered by
the government.
In United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 431 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ill.
1977), the court rejected a proposed plea bargain incorporating as one of its terms that
the case be reassigned to another judge. The court held that Rule 11 "prevent[d]
implementation" of the proposed agreement because the reassignment provision was not
one of the concessions authorized by Rule 11.
37. Many other types of plea bargains have been used in the past. See J. BOND, supra
note 9, at 19-21; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 866 n.7 (1964). One type involved prosecutions
against third parties. See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1211-13 (1975). Another type specified where the defendant would be
incarcerated. See Casebeer v. United States, 531 F.2d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1976). Cf. United
States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1970) (defendant desired agree-
ment that would ensure his transfer to Washington, D.C.). Judicial plea bargaining, now
forbidden by Rule 11(e)(1), was once prevalent. See Alschuler, supra note 34, at 1077-80.
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).
39. FED. R. CRU. P. 11(e)(4).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(g).
41. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5), (e)(6). These provisions authorize the use of a de-
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II. The Use of the Rule 11 Record
A major purpose of the 1975 Amendments in expanding the Rule
11 record was to facilitate prompt disposition of post conviction at-
tacks on guilty pleas. Commentators long had recommended a more
thorough examination at the time a plea was taken, reasoning that
"the slight additional time spent in careful questioning [would]
eliminate most collateral attacks on guilty pleas, thus saving judicial
time in the long run. '4 2 In testimony before Congress, representatives
of the Rules Advisory Committee reported that an "underlying con-
cern" in formulating the Amendments was the belief that "a con-
temporaneous record . . . of the circumstances of pleas of guilty"
would enable the "validity of subsequent collateral attacks on such
pleas [to] be promptly and correctly determined." 43
The Rule 11 hearing can dispose of post conviction attacks in two
ways. First, the rule is well established that when the merits of a claim
fendant's statements (other than the guilty plea itself) in a later prosecution for perjury
if the statements were made under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
The House Committee report made clear that Rule 11 was not "to be construed as
mandating or encouraging the swearing-in of the defendant." HousE REPORT, supra note
33, at 7 n.9. Some circuit courts require that defendants be sworn at the Rule 11 hearing.
Compare United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (3rd Cir. 1974) (defendants
must be sworn) and Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1079 (1974) (en banc) (same) with United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 637 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1976) (defendants need not be sworn).
The value of putting defendants under oath is questionable. Presumably, this practice
is intended to deter defendants from lying to the court at the time of pleading guilty.
Yet, defendants who lie in order to get their plea accepted do so under the influence of
secret threats or promises; the remote prospect of a perjury prosecution is unlikely to be
an effective deterrent. Also, the threat of an additional sentence has minimal deterrent
effect on a defendant who already faces a long jail term. See Wright & Sofaer, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75
YALE L.J. 895, 933 (1966). Finally, since defendants who lie are precisely those who may
have had their constitutional rights violated by the government, the result of the oath
requirement, if effective, would be to deter prisoners from presenting meritorious claims.
Two Congressmen, criticizing the inclusion of the oath provisions in the 1975 Amend-
ments, noted that innocent persons who were coerced to plead guilty could be
prosecuted for falsely admitting their guilt. HousE REPORT, supra note 33, at 37 (separate
views of Reps. Holtzman & Drinan).
42. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 13 n.30. See Davis, The Guilty Plea Process:
Exploring The Issues of Voluntariness and Accuracy, 6 VAL. U.L. Rav. 111, 134 (1972);
Erickson, supra note 31, at 845-49; Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7
LINCOLN L. Rrv. 137, 208 (1972); Underwood, Let's Put Plea Discussions-and Agreements
-On Record, 1 LoY. Cmi. L.J. 1, 5-14 (1970).
43. House Hearings If, supra note 24, at 210 (statement of Judge Lumbard). See 1975
Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10, at 1303; House Hearings I, supra note 21, at
25-26 (Rep. Dennis & Judge Lumbard); id. at 75, 79 (statements of U.S. Attorneys); House
Hearings II, supra note 24, at 36, 48 (statement of Charles Sevilla, chief trial attorney,
Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.). In setting standards for granting evidentiary hear-
ings on post conviction motions, the courts have laid great stress on the need for finality
of criminal convictions. See Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1628, 1629-30, 1631-32 &
nn.17-19 (1977). For a criticism of the standards the courts have set, see pp. 1414-21 infra.
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have been determined adversely to a petitioner at an adequate judicial
hearing, courts are not required to hold another hearing.44 To the
extent that Rule 11 provides a full and fair hearing on the validity of
a guilty plea, therefore, later challenges premised on allegations in-
consistent with the Rule 11 findings need not be heard. Second, when
a petitioner deliberately has failed to present a claim at a judicial
hearing despite an opportunity to do so, his failure under certain
circumstances will constitute a waiver of his claim.4 5 Waiver could
thus bar defendants from post conviction hearings on guilty pleas if
the facts that underpin their attacks were deliberately concealed at
the Rule 11 hearing.
A. Rule 11 as a Prior Full Hearing
In order to act as a full and fair hearing on the validity of a guilty
plea, the Rule 11 hearing must conclusively establish the plea's in-
44. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226-27 & n.8 (1969) (standards for
hearing under § 2255); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1963) (standards for
successive § 2255 motions); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963) (standards for
federal rehearing on questions raised at state hearing). Cf. Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S.
224, 229-30, amended, 410 U.S. 904 (1972) (adequate state hearing forecloses right to a
federal hearing). See generally Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1118-21 (1970).
The Supreme Court, analyzing Rule 11 prior to the 1975 Amendments, observed that
the Rule is "designed to eliminate any need to resort to a later fact-finding proceeding."
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1969). See Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S.
Ct. 1621, 1632 nn.18 & 19 (1977).
45. To be effective, a waiver must generally represent the defendant's knowing and
voluntary decision to forgo the right in question. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct.
1232, 1241-42 (1977) (right to counsel); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1972)
(speedy trial rights). Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver is the "inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"). But see Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-46 (1973) (consent search; waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment rights valid despite defendant's ignorance of the rights waived). See generally Dix,
Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REV. 193
(1977).
This standard of knowing and voluntary waiver was applied to claims raised for the
first time on post conviction attacks in the "deliberate bypass" standard. Fay V. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963). According to Fay, a petitioner's failure to raise a claim at an
earlier hearing would not act as a waiver of the claim unless it was the product of a
knowing and intentional choice by the petitioner. Id. Recently, however, the Supreme
Court has substantially undercut Fay by permitting a waiver of rights to be inferred
from the failure to comply with established procedural rules absent a showing of cause
for noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977)
(failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule waives right to object to
confession introduced at trial); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (failure to raise
claim before trial waives right to attack composition of grand jury); Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (same). Although there is presently no established procedural
rule requiring attacks on guilty pleas to be raised at the Rule 11 hearing to avoid
waiver, see note 68 infra, these cases indicate a new willingness on the part of the
Supreme Court to entertain claims of waiver. See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976) (failure of defendant to object to being tried in prison garb forecloses a later
opportunity to be heard).
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telligence and voluntariness. To establish these elements, the Rule
11 judge must make two different types of assessments. First, he must
attempt to discover the state of the defendant's understanding in the
courtroom at the time of pleading guilty. Second, he must make
factual findings about events that occurred outside the courtroom in
the past: by questioning the defendant, the judge must try to discover
whether the plea is made voluntarily and whether any promises were
offered to induce it.
The utility of the Rule 11 record will in large part depend on
which of these assessments is the subject of post conviction attack.
When the post conviction motion raises questions only about the de-
fendant's understanding at the time of pleading guilty, the record
made at the Rule 11 hearing can be dispositive. Because Rule 11 re-
quires that the judge explain to the defendant the charges against
him and the consequences of his plea 4 the intelligence vel non of the
defendant's decision to plead guilty normally is revealed on the
record. A reviewing court will be able to determine whether the de-
fendant was sufficiently advised to make an intelligent plea simply by
examining this record.4 7 Because Rule 11 also requires the parties to
preserve a mutually satisfactory description of any plea agreements
they have reached 4 the record will contain an objective standard
against which later misunderstandings about the terms of the promises
can be tested.49
When a post conviction motion raises questions about events that
occurred outside the courtroom, the Rule 11 record will be far less use-
ful. Typically, the defendant will allege that he was induced to plead
guilty by government coercion or by a plea bargain, subsequently
broken by the government, that was not revealed at the Rule 11 hear-
ing. Because these inducements may also affect the trustworthiness of
46. See p. 1402 & notes 28-29 supra.
47. This was the basis for the Court's holding in McCarthy. The Court noted that,
had Rule 11 been carefully complied with,
petitioner's own replies to the court's inquiries might well have attested to his un-
derstanding of the essential elements of the crime charged, including the require-
ment of specific intent, and to his knowledge of the acts which formed the basis for
the charge. Otherwise, it would be apparent to the court that the plea could not be
accepted.
394 U.S. at 471.
In determining whether a plea is made knowingly, courts focus primarily on the
adequacy of the advice given to the defendant. E.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,
644-47 (1976) (reviewing whether the defendant had been given notice of the charges). If
the court provides him with all essential advice, later attacks on the intelligence of the
plea can be effectively foreclosed. See ABA GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 1.4,
Commentary at 27; Underwood, supra note 42, at 7.
48. See pp. 1402-03 & notes 31-32 supra.
49. See Underwood, supra note 42, at 9.
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the defendant's Rule 11 statements, that record cannot be relied upon
to dispose of such a post conviction attack. Indeed, to do so would
conflict with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
When allegations of either coercion or concealed government
promises are made, the adverse findings of the Rule 11 proceeding
will rest primarily on statements by the defendant himself; statements
by other parties, such as the prosecution or defense counsel, can do
little more than supplement the defendant's own words.5° The de-
fendant's statements represent testimony, introduced at a judicial
hearing, to establish the existence of facts. Because the facts to be
established are the prerequisites of a valid guilty plea, the accused is
put in the position of testifying in favor of his own conviction. A de-
fendant's statements, used to establish facts leading to his conviction,
must meet Fifth Amendment standards of voluntariness.51
50. In Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977), the Supreme Court suggested that
if the defendant's statements are supplemented by statements by the defense counsel and
prosecutor and by findings made by the judge in accepting the plea, a "formidable
barrier" would be raised to subsequent collateral relief. Id. at 1629. At present, Rule 11
does not require statements by either the defense or prosecution counsel. But some federal
courts do require such statements. E.g., Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 781 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (en bane); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409,
413 (3d Cir. 1973); Martinez v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (D. N.J. 1976). Even
in the absence of such requirements either counsel may make supporting statements.
Unquestionably, statements by the defense or prosecution counsel deserve some weight.
At the time a guilty plea is offered, however, all parties presumably desire its acceptance,
whatever the means by which the plea may have been obtained. Neither the defendant
nor either of the counsel has any interest at this time in having the plea refused, and
thus none of them will be eager to bring doubtful practices to the court's attention. See
Rotenburg, The Progress of Plea Bargaining: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 8 CONN.
L. REv. 44, 64 (1975); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865, 886 (1964); Note, Restructuring the Plea
Bargain, 82 YaLE L.J. 286, 307 n.68 (1972). Statements by counsel, furthermore, will not
have been made under oath or tested by cross-examination, and thus lack the indicia of
reliability that ordinarily accompany testimony admitted at a judicial hearing. Cf. Cali-
fornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (noting advantages of in-court over out-of-court
testimony). For these reasons, undue weight should not be placed on statements by
counsel.
51. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies by
its terms to "any criminal case." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In cases defining the scope of the
self-incrimination privilege, the Supreme Court has used expansive language. In Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972), for example, the Court stated that the
privilege "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution." Occasionally, the Court has gone further and proffered
a broad objective test, implying that the privilege applies to all statements that could in
fact make the imposition of criminal penalties more likely. See, e.g., Lefkowitz 1'. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (quoting McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (privilege
applies "wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who
gives it."))
These formulations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in-
dicate clearly that the privilege covers statements made by a defendant at a Rule 11
hearing. It has frequently been stated that a valid guilty plea is "more than a con-
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These standards are quite strict. Under the test first articulated in
1897 in Brain v. United States,52 the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination forbids the use against a defendant of any
statement " 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence [or] obtained
by any direct or implied promises, however slight.' , This test bars
the use of admissions obtained either by promised benefits"4 or by
actual coercion, such as threats or physical abuse.55 The fact that these
admissions are made in open court and in the presence of counsel does
not eliminate the need to scrutinize their voluntariness; the coercive
impact of threats or promises sufficiently potent to induce a defendant
to plead guilty will not be dissipated merely by the courtroom
setting.5 The Bram rule for testing the voluntariness of statements of
fession" and "is itself a conviction." E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
Proof of the validity of the plea entered at the Rule 11 hearing obviates the need to
prove the defendant's actual guilt at trial. All the considerations of fairness and accuracy
that underlie the application of the Fifth Amendment at trial apply with equal force to
the Rule 11 hearing. If that hearing is intended to establish conclusively the validity of
a plea, and hence conviction, the protections deemed essential at trial must be provided.
As the Supreme Court has observed, the act of pleading guilty necessarily requires a
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
This waiver, however, extends only to the defendant's admission of guilt in open court
and his consent to have judgment entered against him. Cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 32, 37 (1970) (guilty plea ordinarily includes both an admission of guilt and
consent to conviction although the former is not a "constitutional requisite"). The right
not to have improperly obtained admissions used in the conviction proceeding is a
separate matter and its waiver cannot be inferred from the waiver implied in a guilty
plea.
52. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
53. Id. at 542-43 (quoting with approval 3 RussELL ON Cru.ias 478 (6th ed.)). The Court
has consistently adhered to this statement of the test. See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30
(1976) (per curiam); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1963).
54. See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (per curiam) (confession not the product
of "direct or implied promises" held admissible); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371
U.S. 341, 347-48 (1963) (statement procured by promises "can no more be regarded as
the product of a free act of the accused than [a statement] obtained by official physical
or psychological coercion"); Hunter v. Swenson, 442 F.2d 625, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1971)
(confession inadmissible if made in return for promise of reduced charges). See generally
Developments in The Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 938, 978-80 (1966). But see
ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiONMENT PROCEDURE § 150.2(8) (1975) (statement obtained by
promise of leniency, unlike statement obtained by illegal police coercion, should be
admissible if defendant had opportunity to receive adequate advice from counsel). The
ALI rule is questionable, for it blurs the distinction between plea bargaining and police
interrogation and allows police to evade the procedures embodied in Rule 11 to ensure
the fairness of the plea bargaining process.
55. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (threat by 'police officer to kill
defendant); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (prolonged custodial interrogation);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (whipping by deputy sheriff).
56. In cases involving in-court or "judicial" confessions, courts nonetheless review
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's admissions to ensure the absence of
coercion. E.g., Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1958) (although confession was
made in "judicial surroundings" before Justice of the Peace, Court reviewed record to
determine whether confession had been tainted by prior coercive events). See C. Mc-
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fact that may be used to convict a defendant should, of course, be
distinguished from the standards used to test the voluntariness of a
guilty plea itself. Although government promises cannot, under Brain,
be used to obtain incriminating statements from defendants, under
Santobello they may be used to obtain a guilty plea pursuant to a
valid plea bargaining agreement.
Under the Brain test, therefore, a defendant can impeach the Rule
11 record by alleging either government coercion or secret government
promises in his post conviction motion. When a defendant alleges
that his plea was coerced, he will be faced by the fact that he himself
denied being coerced at the time the plea was taken. Yet any govern-
ment coercion powerful enough to induce a defendant to plead guilty
and thus consent to immediate conviction would surely be powerful
enough to obtain untruthful answers to questions about the plea."
In Fontaine v. United States,5 s the Supreme Court confronted pre-
cisely this problem. The petitioner alleged that physical abuse and
prolonged police interrogation had induced his plea of guilty 0 With-
out a hearing, the district court denied the petition on the basis of
Fontaine's Rule 11 statement that the plea was made voluntarily and
without coercion.60 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that al-
though Rule 11 was intended to "flush out and resolve" such issues,
"its exercise is neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to
subsequent challenge calling for an opportunity to prove the allega-
tions." 61
CORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 160 (2d ed. 1972) (statements made by
defendants in judicial proceedings "admissible if the tests applicable to nonjudicial con-
fessions are met"). The presence of counsel, moreover, is not a reliable safeguard. Defense
counsel may be unaware that his client has been pressured to plead guilty. See Machi-
broda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1962). Or the defense attorney may actually
participate in the coercive events. E.g., Alesi v. Craven, 440 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971); see Alschuler, supra note 37, at 1191-95, 1313.
57. See United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1970) ("[I]n cases in
which a guilty plea has been improperly induced, most defendants would be expected to
deny any impropriety during the Rule 11 hearing."); Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The
Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. Rv. 1, 53 n.172 (1975). Cf. Black-
ledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629-30 (1977) (recognizing possibility that defendant's
Rule 11 statements may be "so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding,
duress, or misrepresentation by others" as to open up the plea to collateral attack). The
Supreme Court has recognized the same problem in dealing with confessions that include
admissions of voluntariness. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) ("Com-
mon sense dictates the conclusion that if the authorities were successful in compelling the
totally incriminating confession of guilt, the very issue for determination, they would
have little, if any, trouble securing the self-contained concession of voluntariness."); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (plurality opinion of Douglas, J.).
58. 411 U.S. 213 (1973) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 214.
60. Id. at 213-14.
61. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted).
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When a defendant alleges that his plea was influenced by secret
government promises, subsequently broken, parallel reasoning applies.
Here again the defendant will be faced with his own disavowal of such
promises at the Rule 11 hearing. Yet defendants generally explain their
disingenuousness at the hearing by asserting that secrecy was required
as part of the bargain.6 2 Under the Bram standard of voluntariness, a
defendant cannot be convicted on the basis of statements induced by
a government promise of benefits. When a defendant is induced to
deny the existence of a secret plea agreement at the Rule 11 hearing
because the agreement is conditioned on his silence, the Brara stan-
dard will not permit his misrepresentation to foreclose a later claim
that the promise was broken, since under Santobello a conviction
based on a broken plea bargain cannot stand. The post conviction
petitioner, therefore, need only allege that he was required to conceal
the promise at the Rule 11 hearing as a condition of the bargain in
order to impeach the disclaimer of promises that he made there.
For these reasons, it seems clear that, under the Fifth Amendment,
the Rule 11 record cannot be dispositive of post conviction attacks
premised on allegations about events that occurred outside the Rule
11 hearing. This conclusion may be restated in pragmatic terms: as a
practical matter, a Rule 11 hearing is an unlikely forum for finding
out whether government coercion or secret plea bargaining has oc-
curred. Prosecutors and other government agents have concededly used
coercive plea tactics in the past, 63 and coercion sufficient to induce a
62. See, e.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1962); Bryan v. United
States, 492 F.2d 775, 777 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). Frequently, de-
fendants allege that they were advised to conceal the bargain, not by a government
official, but by their attorney. E.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1626-27 (1977).
Because most actual bargaining takes place between prosecutor and defense counsel out-
side the defendant's presence, courts generally have held that defendants may reasonably
rely on their attorney's representation that a bargain exists even if this representation
later proves false. See United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3rd Cir. 1974);
Mosher v. LaVallee, 351 F. Supp. 1101, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). For the same reason, defendants may generally
be expected to rely on their attorney's warning that a bargain must be concealed, and
the fact that the concealment owes to the advice of defense counsel rather than of the
prosecution should be irrelevant. See Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1631 (1977) (if
defendant had been "advised by counsel to conceal any plea bargain, his denial that any
promises bad been made might have been a courtroom ritual more sham than real")
(citation omitted); Edwards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374, 1379 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 950 (1976).
63. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3, Commentary at 615
(1975); Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO.
LJ. 1030, 1035-36 (1967). A recent study of the prevalence of guilty pleas in various
federal districts concluded that prosecutors in some districts obtained numerous con-
victions through guilty pleas in cases in which the defendant would not have been con-
victed at trial. See Finkelstein, supra note 21. The author suggested that his findings
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plea of guilty will not be uncovered by inquiries directed to the de-
fendant. The same is true of plea bargaining. Even after any real
doubts about the propriety of plea bargaining had dissipated, some
bargains continued to be concealed. 64 Ordinarily both the defendant
and prosecution will find it in their interest to put promises on the
record,a but the fear of judicial disapproval may give them an incen-
tive to bargain secretly.66 Where an illegitimate bargain has been
reached, it is unrealistic to expect that the parties will reveal it. If the
alleged abuses actually occurred, then there is good reason to believe
that the Rule 11 proceeding will fail to discover them. It would seem
unwise to rely on prior findings obtained by methods so unlikely to
be effective in determining the facts.
should be interpreted to show the need for "more particularized judgments" about the
voluntariness of pleas. Id. at 295. Because the study relied on statistical analysis rather
than on observations in the field, however, it cannot be taken as evidence that prosecu-
torial behavior has in fact exceeded the limits set by the Supreme Court.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156, 1158 (8th Cir. 1976) (post-Santo-
bello); Rosado v. United States, 510 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975) (pre-Santobello but post-
Brady); Karger v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 595, 597 (D. Mass. 1975) (same). In Rosado
the defendant signed a sworn statement that no secret bargains or promises had been
made to induce his plea and then pled guilty to a charge for which the court informed
him that he had a complete defense. Id. at 1100. Subsequently, the prosecutor dropped
three related counts that had been brought under another statute. Id. at 1100 n.l. In
reviewing the defendant's post conviction motion, the court refused to order an inquiry
into the possible existence of plea bargaining.
65. See Underwood, supra note 42, at 9.
66. Plea bargaining was routinely concealed during the years when doubts about its
propriety persisted. See note 24 supra. Even after Santobello and the 1975 Amendments
to Rule 11, however, many restrictions on the parties' freedom to bargain remain. Only
certain types of agreements are legitimated by the Rule, and others may be disapproved
by implication. See note 36 supra. District judges are given discretion to accept or reject
any particular plea agreement, see note 33 supra, and some judges may refuse to allow
plea bargaining at all, see notes 21 & 34 supra, or may refuse to consider certain types of
agreements even though they are authorized by Rule 11. See note 33 supra; United
States v. Martin, 409 F. Supp. 155, 157 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (district court twice refused
proffered guilty plea because it was "induced by a plea bargain which was unacceptable
to the Court."). If judges attempt to regulate the fairness of the bargains reached by
the parties, see note 34 supra, additional impediments to bargaining freedom will arise.
These impediments may lead to continued secret bargaining. See Comment, 14 A.Mt. CRIM.
L. REv. 305, 314 & n.46 (1976) (suggesting that limits on the parties' freedom to bargain
may generate secret bargaining).
In 1973, New York enacted statutory controls on plea bargaining, now substantially
modified, in an attempt to increase penalties for drug offenses. After indictment for
specified drug offenses, the law limited the entrance of a guilty plea to a lesser included
offense. 1973 N.Y. LAws, ch. 276, § 23.6 (McKinney) (current version at N.Y. CRI. PROC.
LAW § 220.10(5) (McKinney 1977)); see Signorelli, A Judicial Analysis and Critique of the
New Drug and Sentencing Laws, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 9, 11-12 (1974). As a result of the law,
many defendants, particularly minor offenders, chose to go to trial. In 1975, the backlog
of drug cases in New York City alone reached 1,600. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1975, at 61,
col. 3. This pressure caused courts and prosecutors to circumvent the prohibition on
plea bargaining by striking bargains prior to the time of indictment. N.Y. Times, Feb.
11, 1975, at 78, col. 2. See Signorelli, supra at 19.
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B. Waiver and the Rule 11 Hearing
Even if the Rule 11 hearing did not itself adequately determine the
merits of a later claim, a finding of waiver could provide an alterna-
tive basis for dispensing with a hearing.0 7 At the time a guilty plea is
taken, the defendant obviously will be aware of any threats or promises
that have been made to him, and the required judicial inquiry into
these matters gives him an ample opportunity to voice his objections.
Arguably, his failure to do so at the Rule 11 hearing may constitute a
waiver of his claims.0 8
Yet waiver is an inappropriate ground for denying hearings. This is
clearest when the defendant claims that he was compelled to plead
guilty by government threats or other misconduct. If coercion actually
occurred, it would be wholly unrealistic to expect the defendant to
mention it at the time his plea was taken. As the Supreme Court has
observed, if a plea is "so coerced as to deprive it of validity to support
[a] conviction, the coercion likewise deprive[s] it of validity as a
waiver of [the defendant's] right to assail the conviction." 69
Waiver is also inappropriate when the defendant claims that the
government broke a secret plea bargain. In this case, the defendant
seeks to assert his Santobello right to have plea promises enforced. His
deliberate concealment of the promise at the Rule 11 hearing, it
may be argued, should constitute a waiver of the right to have it
enforced. Yet the act of concealment can scarcely be termed a product
of the defendant's free choice. Defendants who engage in secret plea
bargaining may well have been induced to surrender the protection
of putting plea agreements on record in exchange for promised bene-
fits unavailable through Rule 11 procedures.70 A defendant's election
67. See note 45 supra.
68. Most courts have ignored the possibility of waiver in reviewing post conviction
attacks on guilty pleas. In the Third Circuit, however, district judges are advised, among
other things, to warn the defendant when pleading guilty that "he may not at a later
time contend that any promise, representation, agreement or understanding was made
... other than that set forth in open court." United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585,
588 (3d Cir. 1974). See United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (3d Cir. 1974)
(Valenciano warnings are mandatory). Despite this requirement, the Third Circuit has
not actually barred subsequent allegations of concealed plea bargains on grounds of
waiver. Rather, the court has viewed its warning as a means of deterring defendants from
misrepresenting facts in Rule 11 hearings by threatening a perjury prosecution. Id. at
1187, 1188.
69. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
70. Indeed, since it will generally be in the defendant's interest to put plea agree-
ments on record, see p. 1412 & notes 27, 65 supra, it is difficult to suggest other motives
for concealment.
To be sure, the fact that the promise is off the record creates an evidentiary problem
for the post conviction petitioner who must prove that a promise was made but not kept.
A finding of waiver, however, would strip the defendant of the right to assert a post con-
viction claim whether proof was available or not.
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to conceal the promises made to him would thus be the direct result of
the government's condition of secrecy-an interference with free choice
that should nullify any suggestion of waiver."'
III. Finality and Rule 11
This Note argues that it will often be impossible to dispose of post
conviction attacks on guilty pleas by reference to the record made at
the Rule 11 hearing. In such cases an evidentiary hearing on the post
conviction motion will have to be held. By depriving many convictions
based on guilty pleas of finality, this conclusion entails important
consequences for the criminal justice system.
The American criminal justice system depends heavily on guilty
pleas. To provide a trial to every person charged with a criminal
offense would require a vast expansion of the resources allocated to
the administration of the criminal law."2 In legitimating plea bar-
gaining the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged this fact,73 and
regarded its decisions as a means of ensuring that the stream of guilty
pleas would continue.
71. Courts have often refused to recognize waivers made under analogous conditions.
See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973) (waiver of Fifth Amendment
privilege "secured under threat of substantial economic sanction" invalid because in-
voluntary); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1968) (no waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights where government presents gambler with choice of abandoning
gambling or providing evidence incriminating to himself); cf. McKnight v. United States,
507 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1975) (§ 2255 motion not barred by failure to appeal if
decision to forgo appeal not made voluntarily).
In the case of Santobello claims, there is a particular need to provide hearings in order
to deter attempts by the prosecution to evade Rule 11 limits on plea bargaining. See
note 27 supra (1975 Amendments intended to end secrecy and lack of accountability to
judicial control of plea bargaining). By relieving the government of its responsibility to
carry out plea bargain commitments not revealed at the Rule 11 hearing, this application
of the doctrine of waiver would create dangerous incentives for prosecutors to bargain
off the record. See note 66 supra.
Furthermore, there is little prejudice to prosecution interests in allowing such claims
to be heard. For other types of claims the government may be unable to retry a defendant
if a constitutional claim, not asserted in a timely fashion, is found meritorious in a post
conviction attack. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 n.13 (1977) (collateral
attack "may be made many years after the conviction when it may be impossible, as a
practical matter, to conduct a retrial"); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 147 (1970) (inability to retry
defendant "even more likely" where conviction based on guilty plea because of lack of
trial transcript). This presents no problem for Santobello claims. Because one recognized
remedy for a broken plea bargain is specific performance of the promise made, see note
22 supra, relief can be fashioned in such a case without requiring a new trial if the
government has been prejudiced .by the delay.
72. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities."); note I supra.
73. 404 U.S. at 260-61; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970).
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In view of this heavy dependence on guilty pleas, any liberal policy
of granting hearings when guilty pleas are attacked may seem quixotic.
Such hearings unquestionably will intensify the already considerable
strain that post conviction petitions place on courts and correctional
institutions. 74 Indeed, such hearings may well cancel out much of the
savings in judicial time and resources that the reliance on guilty pleas
was meant to produce.7 5
Against these considerations of judicial economy must be balanced
the central purpose of the system of post conviction remedies: to
protect human liberty.70 This purpose inevitably will be frustrated
unless a hearing is given to every petitioner who advances a colorable
claim for relief. In any case in which the Rule 11 record fails to
negate conclusively the allegations of wrongdoing or to form the basis
for a finding of valid waiver, there is simply no way to know if a claim
is baseless unless it is heard.
This conclusion, not surprisingly, has proven unpalatable to many
courts, and judicial techniques have been devised for concluding post
conviction attacks without a hearing, or with only a limited one. Be-
cause a guilty plea forecloses the procedural safeguards available at
trial, however, these techniques must be carefully scrutinized to ensure
that no unfairness is visited upon defendants who plead guilty.7 7 On
74. For judicial observations on the costs entailed in hearing post conviction attacks,
see Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1628 (1977); id. at 1634-35 (Powell, J., concurring);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The most significant
cost is the judicial time consumed in processing the claims, the vast majority of which
prove unfounded. In 1974, federal prisoners filed 1,822 motions to vacate sentence and
1,718 petitions for habeas corpus-a total of 3,540 post conviction petitions and an in-
crease of 524 over the preceding year. [1974] AD. OF. oF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 221.
Federal courts fail to grant the relief requested in 96% of all prisoner cases. [1971] AD.
OF. oF THE U.S. COuRTS ANN. REP. 132. In fact, however, few cases receive an evidentiary
hearing. See note 92 infra (tabulating cases).
Some observers doubt whether the relitigation of facts in a hearing long after the
original conviction will exceed or even equal the accuracy of the job originally done.
See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REV. 441, 446-53 (1963); Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1120 & n.39 (1970). Cf. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 518 (1965) (arguing
that since any relitigation will have its own errors, the point of diminishing returns may
be reached after one full hearing).
75. "To allow indiscriminate hearings in federal postconviction proceedings . . .
would eliminate the chief virtues of the plea system-speed, economy, and finality."
Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1628 (1977).
76. See id. at 1628 ("very purpose" of habeas corpus is "to safeguard a person's free-
dom from detention in violation of constitutional guarantees"); cf. Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) ("Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.")
77. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22 (1963) (the "summary nature" of con-
viction by guilty plea enhances need for access to post conviction review).
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balance, it seems that these techniques will be ineffective or will be
effective only by sacrificing fairness.
A. Judicially Evolved Techniques
Even though there is no assurance that the Rule 11 hearing will
catch violations at the time the guilty plea is entered, some courts have
viewed the availability of the Rule 11 record as justifying a require-
ment that petitioners attacking guilty pleas make certain initial show-
ings.78 This requirement has taken two forms.
Some circuits have imposed a requirement of additional factual
pleading.7 9 In Crawford v. United States,s0 the Fourth Circuit adopted
the rule that the "accuracy and truth" of a defendant's Rule 11 state-
ments will be deemed conclusively established unless he alleges facts
that show a reasonable excuse to set those statements aside.8' In this
78. In a general way, the Supreme Court endorsed these efforts in Blackledge. Al-
though the Court recognized that there could be no "per se" rule denying hearings to
those who plead guilty, 97 S. Ct. at 1629-30, it suggested that if procedures comparable
to Rule 11 are scrupulously followed petitioners will be entitled to evidentiary hearings
"only in the most extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 1632 n.19. The Court did not
elaborate as to what circumstances would be sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a
hearing.
79. A § 2255 petition must meet factual pleading requirements that go well beyond
those for most civil pleadings. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only
"notice pleading" for civil complaints generally-allegations sufficient to inform the
other parties to the litigation of the nature of the claim being asserted. FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). A § 2255 petition, however, must
state particular facts sufficient to establish a claim for relief. See Developments in the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1173-74 & n.127 (1970) (citing au-
thorities). Courts, moreover, have a limited discretion not to hear claims whose allegations
the court finds "palpably incredible." Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1630 (1977)
(citing Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)).
In Blackledge, the Court intimated that if procedures similar to those currently em-
bodied in Rule 11 had been followed when the guilty plea was taken, any subsequent
allegations of a secret unkept promise might be too unbelievable to warrant a hearing.
97 S. Ct. at 1630-32. The Court's suggestion is disingenuous. It would be quite proper
to suggest that if the Rule 11 procedures were sufficient to constitute a full and fair
hearing on the merits of a claim, one hearing would suffice. See pp. 1405-06 & note 44
supra. But to suggest that procedures that are inadequate to produce a binding adjudi-
cation on the merits can nevertheless make a petitioner's allegations so unlikely to be
true as to warrant summary dismissal is to render the requirement of a full and fair
hearing nugatory. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22 (1963) (applicant for post
conviction relief should not be "cursorily dismissed because his claim seems unlikely to
prove meritorious. That his application is vexatious or repetitious, or that his claim
lacks any substance, must be fairly demonstrated.") This is not to say that some alle-
gations attacking guilty pleas are not so authentically incredible so as to dispense with
the need for a hearing. E.g., Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 779-80 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (en banc).
80. 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1057 (1976).
81. Id. at 350. The court continued, "[WV]e hold that a defendant should not be
heard to controvert his Rule 11 statements in a subsequent § 2255 motion unless he
offers a valid reason why he should be permitted to depart from the apparent truth
of his earlier statement." Id. See, e.g, Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566, 568 (4th Cir.
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way, it was hoped that petitions alleging facts inconsistent with the
Rule 11 record could be dismissed without a hearing. Other circuits
have adopted similar rules.8 2
Requiring a petitioner to plead facts sufficient to impeach the Rule
11 record is consistent with the general principle that an adequate
prior hearing will eliminate the need for a second hearing. Yet be-
cause the Rule 11 record is quite vulnerable to attack, this barrier is
hardly a formidable one. In practice, petitioners have generally had
little trouble in alleging an excuse sufficient to overturn their original
statements.8
3
An alternative approach, adopted by the Fifth Circuit, has been
more effective in dispensing with hearings on guilty plea attacks. Be-
ginning with Bryan v. United States,8 4 that court has refused to grant
hearings on petitions whose allegations contradict the petitioner's Rule
11 statements. In order to overcome this contradiction, a petitioner
must support his claim with reliable third party affidavits or other
documents.8 5 Instead of focusing on the adequacy of the Rule 11
1976) (excuse offered by petitioner insufficient to warrant evidentiary hearing); Ed-
wards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1347, 1377 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976)
(allegation of secret plea bargain sufficient excuse to warrant evidentiary hearing).
82. See United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 247, 249-50 (8th Cir. 1976) (embracing
Crawford rule); Hedman v. United States, 527 F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir. 1975) (same, without
attribution); United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183, 1185-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (reason-
able reliance by defendant on counsel's misrepresentations about existence of out-of-
court "arrangement" warrants evidentiary hearing).
83. The Fourth Circuit has decided five cases applying the Crawford rule. Of these,
the petitioner's excuse was found sufficient in four. Allison v. Blackledge, 533 F.2d 894
(4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977); Edwards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976); Bass v. United States, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir.
1975); United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975). Only in Edmonds v.
Lewis, 546 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1976), was a hearing denied. See Allison v. Blackledge,
533 F.2d at 899 (Field, J., concurring specially) ("A distillation of these decisions dem-
onstrates .. . that no matter how searching the inquiry of the court may be on the
issue of voluntariness, no trial judge, state or federal, can protect himself against a
later complaint by a convicted criminal" that his rights were violated.)
Other circuits that have embraced the Crawford rule have had greater success in
eliminating hearings. E.g., United States v. Williams, 536 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1976) (de-
nying hearing on allegations of promises by defense attorney); Hedman v. United States,
527 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1975) (denying hearing on allegations of involuntary plea and
ineffective assistance of counsel).
84. 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (en banc). For cases
implementing Bryan, see, e.g., Clayton v. Estelle, 541 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Barrett, 514 F.2d 1241, 1243 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally 53 TEx. L.
REv. 147 (1974) (discussing Bryan). In Bryan, the court asserted that it would treat each
case on its individual merits rather than create a "per se" rule. 492 F.2d at 778. After
Bryan, however, only cases with substantial documentary support have received hearings.
See Matthews v. United States, 533 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 1156 (1977).
85. See Matthews v. United States, 533 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 1156 (1977) (affidavit of counsel); Vandenades v. United States, 523 F.2d 1220 (5th
Cir. 1975) (letter from sentencing judge); Dugan v. United States, 521 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1975) (affidavit of sheriff and deputy).
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hearing, this rule puts the burden on the defendant to make an af-
firmative showing that his claim is likely to succeed on the merits.
Not surprisingly, most petitions have failed to meet this stringent
standard.8 6
Despite its utility in avoiding hearings, the Fifth Circuit rule
sweeps too far. In relying on the presumed accuracy of the Rule 11
record, it makes no allowance for the possibility that the original
hearing was flawed. Factual allegations sufficient to void the Rule 11
record are simply ignored.8 7 Courts may thus deny hearings on the
basis of a record tainted with statements obtained by secret promises
or coercion. Moreover, requiring petitioners to produce evidence in
support of their claims at such an early stage may place an unfair
burden on them. Post conviction petitioners who must proceed pro se
while incarcerated will usually lack the ability to marshal evidence
that would otherwise be available.88 If claims are dismissed for failure
86. For cases denying hearings, see Goodwin v. United States, 544 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1977); Clayton v. Estelle, 541 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Massey, 516 F.2d 1001
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Barrett, 514 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1975); Jackson v.
United States, 512 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1975); Rosado v. United States, 510 F.2d 1098
(5th Cir. 1975); Frank v. United States, 501 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1974). For cases ordering
hearings, see note 85 supra.
87. In United States v. Barrett, 514 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1975), the court, relying on
Bryan, refused to allow a hearing on a claim that lengthy pre-trial incarceration under
substandard jail conditions had coerced the petitioner's guilty plea. The claim, if proven,
probably would have sufficed to set the plea aside. See Prettyjohn v. United States, 419
F.2d 651, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970) (statement of Bazelon, C.J.)
(defendant's guilty plea induced by jail conditions may be vulnerable to collateral at-
tack for involuntariness). The court, however, ignored facts in the record supporting
Barrett's claim. Conditions at the jail in which Barrett had been confined had been
found by a federal judge to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, 514 F.2d at 1242,
and Barrett had complained to his attorney that his health was suffering from them,
id. at 1243. If Barrett had indeed pled guilty to escape inhuman jail conditions, he
would hardly have made Rule 11 statements inconsistent with having the plea accepted-
such as that the plea was involuntary.
In Frank v. United States, 501 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1974), the court also refused to order
a hearing, this time on a claim that a plea bargain concealed at the Rule 11 hearing
had been broken by the government. Frank alleged that his attorney had instructed
him to conceal the promise when he pled guilty. 501 F.2d at 174. If true, this allega-
tion would provide an excuse for concealment. See note 62 supra.
88. Dissenting in Bryan, Judge Goldberg pointed out that under a rule requiring a
prisoner to produce competent evidence other than his own affidavit as a condition
of receiving a hearing, the "realities of prison life" could "unreasonably and unneces-
sarily" restrict access to hearings. 492 F.2d at 783 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) ("the petitioner,
being in custody, is usually handicapped in developing the evidence needed to support
in necessary detail the facts alleged in his petition").
In Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977), the district court had dismissed Allison's
petition for habeas corpus upon the recommendation of the United States Magistrate
to whom the matter had been referred. The Magistrate recommended dismissal after
Allison failed to comply with instructions to supply notarized statements supporting
his allegations from a codefendant, confined in a different prison, who had allegedly
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to come forward with affidavits at a time when petitioners have the
benefit neither of discovery nor of counsel, meritorious as well as
frivolous claims will be barred.
B. Procedures for Summary Disposition
The large number of frivolous post conviction petitions has under-
scored the need for procedures to dispose of such attacks summarily.
The newly adopted Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the
United States District Courts offer a variety of procedures designed to
test the factual basis of a petitioner's claim without a full fact-finding
hearing. In appropriate cases, a broad range of discovery tools is
available to the parties.8 9 Through procedures for expanding the
record, affidavits and other documents relevant to resolving the merits
of a claim can be put before the court.90 All these documents are
considered in making the decision whether or not to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing.
Unfortunately, the most troublesome cases are those turning on
witnessed the events in question. Id. at 1627, 1634 n.26. The Supreme Court disapproved
of this action, noting that it "imposed upon Allison a novel and formless burden of
supplying proof, without the benefit of compulsory process and without any intimation
that dismissal would follow if that burden were not met." Id. at 1634 n.26. For an
analysis of the problems facing an incarcerated litigant who must proceed pro se, see
Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE L.J.
292, 304-07 (1976).
89. SEcTiON 2255 RULES, supra note 5, Rule 6.
For a discussion of the use of pre-hearing discovery in habeas corpus petitions filed
by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, see Notes of the Advisory Committee, Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 6, reprinted in
28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254, at 339-40 (West Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as § 2254 Ad-
visory Committee Notes]. In habeas cases, it is contemplated that pre-hearing discovery
will eliminate some evidentiary hearings, as by showing that there are "'no disputed
issues of law or fact.'" Id. at 340 (quoting Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1181 (1970)). The Committee conceded, however, that
pre-hearing discovery will "probably not [be] as frequently sought or granted as dis-
covery in conjunction with a hearing." Id. The Advisory Committee stated that this
discussion of discovery under the § 2254 Rules governing state prisoners "is fully ap-
plicable to discovery under these rules for § 2255 motions" filed by federal prisoners.
Notes of the Advisory Committee, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the
United States District Courts, Rule 6, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2255, at 110
(West Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as § 2255 Advisory Committee Notes].
90. In cases that survive summary dismissal, the court "may direct that the record
be expanded" to include affidavits, "letters predating the filing of the motion in the
district court, documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, if so directed, to written
interrogatories propounded by the judge." SEcriON 2255 RULES, supra note 5, Rule 7(a),
(b). See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1970) (discussing dis-
position on an expanded record). The main purpose of this rule is to "enable the
judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the
time and expens6 required for an evidentiary hearing" and thus to "eliminate some un-
necessary hearings." § 2254 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 89, at 341 (adopted for
§ 2255 proceedings in § 2255 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 89, at 110).
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contested issues of fact,0 1 and where such conflicts exist there is little
hope that an evidentiary hearing can be avoided 2 A hearing may be
unnecessary, of course, if the procedures show that the petitioner can
obtain no evidence to support his claim.9 3 But expansion of the record
through discovery or affidavits can produce only documentary forms of
evidence. In guilty plea cases the critical events will generally have
taken place in the petitioner's presence and with his participation,9 4
91. If it "plainly appears from the face of the motion" and accompanying record
that the petitioner's claim is unfounded, summary dismissal by the district judge is
permitted. SECTION 2255 RULES, supra note 5, Rule 4(b).
92. Prior to the enactment of the new Rules, a majority of the petitions that escaped
summary dismissal raised factual issues necessitating an evidentiary hearing. See § 2254
Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 89, at 342. A compilation of statistics for § 2255
motions between the years 1970 and 1974 reveals the following pattern.*
# of cases
# of cases disposed of
total # of disposed of during or # of cases
fiscal cases receiving before pretrial after pretrial disposed of
year court action conference conference at trial
1970 1,627 1,525 10 92
1971 1,404 1,314 13 77
1972 1,549 1,508 6 35
1973 1,676 1,617 8 51
1974 1,792 1,740 5 47
Total 8,048 7,704 42 302
* Data taken from [1970-74] AD. OF. OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. Table C-4.
93. SECTION 2255 RULES, supra note 5, Rule 4(b).
In Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that, "[a]s
in civil cases generally," a petition for habeas corpus filed in federal court by a state
prisoner is subject to a motion for summary judgment by the state. Id. at 1632-33.
Through such a motion, the state can test whether the allegations of the petition have
"sufficient basis in fact to warrant plenary presentation of evidence." Id. It is not
clear whether this procedure would also be available to test a § 2255 motion by a
federal prisoner. Unlike a writ of habeas corpus, a § 2255 petition represents "a fur-
ther step in the movant's criminal case" rather than a separate civil action. § 2255
Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 89, at 104-05. But see id. at 111 (standards for
granting hearing on § 2255 motion "essentially the same" as those applied to habeas
petition).
Whether summary judgment is directly available in § 2255 motions or not, the rules
governing summary judgment suggest reasonable limits on federal courts' summary dis-
missal of § 2255 motions. See note 95 infra. A prisoner seeking relief should not be
denied a hearing for failure to come forward with affidavits or other documentary evi-
dence until the government has made an initial factual showing that his claim is
without merit. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). When affidavits are demanded, the § 2255 peti-
tioner's own affidavit should be sufficient for matters of which he has personal knowl-
edge, id., and the petitioner should be given an opportunity to escape dismissal by
showing that essential affidavits are unobtainable, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Finally, a case
should not be disposed of by affidavits as long as there remains a "genuine issue as to
any material fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, when the affidavits submitted by the
petitioner and government contain conflicting versions of the pivotal events, an eviden-
tiary hearing should be required.
94. Attacks on guilty pleas that focus either on the intelligent or voluntary nature
of the plea or on the existence of unkept plea bargains necessarily involve events in
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and fairness demands that he be allowed to pit his credibility against
that of opposing witnesses before the factfinder.95 Thus, when a peti-
tioner alleges facts that would entitle him to relief and that refer to
events in which he personally participated, a new hearing ordinarily
will be required.
Conclusion
The conclusion of this analysis can be stated simply: post conviction
motions attacking guilty pleas need to be heard. This conclusion
should not be taken to imply that the 1975 Amendments to Rule 11
have failed. The comprehensive hearing held at the time the plea is
taken can succeed in eliminating later hearings when attacks are made
on the knowing and intelligent character of a plea. 6 More im-
portantly, the Rule 11 hearing can be expected to prevent some viola-
tions of defendants' rights from occurring at all.97 The fact remains,
however, that even a reformed Rule 11 cannot eliminate the need for
post conviction hearings when attacks are directed at events that
transpired outside the Rule 11 hearing. Without a post conviction
hearing, there is simply no fully effective means of uncovering in-
stances of abuse of defendants' rights. Neither the judicially created
rules relying on the Rule 11 record nor the new procedures for sum-
mary disposition of claims can be relied upon to separate meritorious
claims from the large number of frivolous ones. While the search for
some fully effective screening device goes on, the avenues of post
conviction relief for those who plead guilty must remain open.
which the defendant personally participated. See note 62 supra. The opposite might
be true, for example, of attacks that focus on the effectiveness of the defendant's
counsel. See, e.g., Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972) (claim of attorney's conflict of
interest).
95. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963), the Court stressed the importance
of allowing testimonial evidence to be introduced. "Where an unresolved factual dispute
exists, demeanor evidence is a significant factor in adjudging credibility. And questions
of credibility, of course, are basic to resolution of conflicts in testimony. . . . [T]he
petitioner, and the State, must be given the opportunity to present . . . testimonial . . .
evidence relevant to the disputed issues." See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
219-23 (1952) (interpreting § 2255 to require petitioner's presence at hearing when
there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which he participated).
In Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1633 n.25 (1977), the Court suggested that
"[t]here may be cases" in which documentary evidence would prove so overwhelming
as to eliminate the need for an evidentiary hearing. However, the Court apparently
viewed this as a narrow exception to the general rule, noting that '-[w]hen the issue
is one of credibility, resolution on the basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive
Id. (quoting Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970)).
96. See p. 1407 supra.
97. See note 27 supra.
1421
